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Abstract
It is known that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial at-
tacks. The so-called physical adversarial examples deceive DNN-based decision
makers by attaching adversarial patches to real objects. However, most of the ex-
isting works on physical adversarial attacks focus on static objects such as glass
frames, stop signs and images attached to cardboard. In this work, we propose
Adversarial T-shirts, a robust physical adversarial example for evading person de-
tectors even if it could undergo non-rigid deformation due to a moving person’s
pose changes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that models the
effect of deformation for designing physical adversarial examples with respect to
non-rigid objects such as T-shirts. We show that the proposed method achieves
74% and 57% attack success rates in the digital and physical worlds respectively
against YOLOv2. In contrast, the state-of-the-art physical attack method to fool a
person detector only achieves 18% attack success rate. Furthermore, by leverag-
ing min-max optimization, we extend our method to the ensemble attack setting
against two object detectors YOLO-v2 and Faster R-CNN simultaneously.
1 Introduction
The vulnerability of deep neural networks (DNNs) against adversarial attacks (namely,
perturbed inputs deceiving DNNs) has been found in applications spanning from image
classification to speech recognition [18, 33, 35, 6, 32, 2]. Early works studied adversar-
ial examples only in the digital space. Recently, some works showed that it is possible
to create adversarial perturbations on physical objects and fool DNN-based decision
makers under a variety of real-world conditions [28, 13, 1, 14, 25, 7, 30, 5, 21]. The
design of physical adversarial attacks helps to evaluate the robustness of DNNs de-
ployed in real-life systems, e.g., autonomous vehicles and surveillance systems. How-
ever, most of the studied physical adversarial attacks encounter two limitations: a) the
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Figure 1: Evaluation of the effectiveness of adversarial T-shirts to evade person detection by YOLOv2.
Each row corresponds to a specific attack method while each column except the last one shows an individual
frame in a video. The last column shows the adversarial patterns applied to the T-shirts. At each frame, there
are two persons, one of whom wears the adversarial T-shirt. First row: digital adversarial T-shirt generated
using TPS. Second row: physical adversarial T-shirt generated using TPS. Third row: physical adversarial T-
shirt generated using affine transformation (namely, in the absence of TPS). Fourth row: T-shirt with physical
adversarial patch considered in [30] to evade person detectors.
physical objects are usually considered being static, and b) the possible deformation of
adversarial pattern attached to a moving object (e.g., due to pose change of a moving
person) is commonly neglected. In this paper, we propose a new type of physical adver-
sarial attack, adversarial T-shirt, to evade DNN-based person detectors when a person
wears the adversarial T-shirt; see the second row of Fig. 1 for illustrative examples.
Related work Most of the existing physical adversarial attacks are generated against
image classifiers and object detectors. In [28], a face recognition system is fooled by
a real eyeglass frame designed under a crafted adversarial pattern. In [13], a stop sign
is misclassified by adding black or white stickers on it against the image classification
system. In [21], an image classifier is fooled by placing a crafted sticker at the lens of
a camera. In [1], a so-called Expectation over Transformation (EoT) framework was
proposed to synthesize adversarial examples robust to a set of physical transformations
such as rotation, translation, contrast, brightness, and random noise. Compared to at-
tacking image classifiers, generating physical adversarial attacks against object detec-
tors is more involved. For example, the adversary is required to mislead the bounding
box detector of an object when attacking YOLOv2 [26] and SSD [24]. A well-known
success of such attacks in the physical world is the generation of adversarial stop sign
[14], which deceives state-of-the-art object detectors such as YOLOv2 and Faster R-
CNN [27].
The most relevant approach to ours is the work of [30], which demonstrates that a
person can evade a detector by holding a cardboard with an adversarial patch. How-
ever, such a physical attack restricts the adversarial patch to be attached to a rigid
carrier (namely, cardboard), and is different from our setting here where the generated
adversarial pattern is directly printed on a T-shirt. We show that the attack proposed by
[30] becomes ineffective when the adversarial patch is attached to a T-shirt (rather than
a cardboard) and worn by a moving person (see the fourth row of Fig. 1). At the tech-
nical side, different from [30] we propose a thin plate spline (TPS) based transformer
to model deformation of non-rigid objects, and develop an ensemble physical attack
that fools object detectors YOLOv2 and Faster R-CNN simultaneously. We highlight
that our proposed adversarial T-shirt is not just a T-shirt with printed adversarial patch
for clothing fashion, it is a physical adversarial wearable designed for evading person
detectors in the real world.
Our work is also motivated by the importance of person detection on intelligent
surveillance. DNN-based surveillance systems have significantly advanced the field of
object detection [17, 16]. Efficient object detectors such as faster R-CNN [27], SSD
[24], and YOLOv2 [26] have been deployed for human detection. Thus, one may
wonder whether or not there exists a security risk for intelligent surveillance systems
caused by adversarial human wearables, e.g., adversarial T-shirts. However, paralyzing
a person detector in the physical world requires substantially more challenges such as
low resolution, pose changes and occlusions. The success of our adversarial T-shirt
against real-time person detectors offers new insights for designing practical physical-
world adversarial human wearables.
Contributions We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We develop a TPS-based transformer to model the temporal deformation of an
adversarial T-shirt caused by pose changes of a moving person. We also show
the importance of such non-rigid transformation to ensuring the effectiveness of
adversarial T-shirts in the physical world.
• We propose a general optimization framework for design of adversarial T-shirts
in both single-detector and multiple-detector settings.
• We conduct experiments in both digital and physical worlds and show that the
proposed adversarial T-shirt achieves 74% and 57% attack success rates respec-
tively when attacking YOLOv2. By contrast, the physical adversarial patch [30]
printed on a T-shirt only achieves 18% attack success rate. Some of our results
are highlighted in Fig. 1.
2 Modeling Deformation of A Moving Object by Thin
Plate Spline Mapping
In this section, we begin by reviewing some existing transformations required in the
design of physical adversarial examples. We then elaborate on the Thin Plate Spline
(TPS) mapping we adopt in this work to model the possible deformation encountered
by a moving and non-rigid object.
Let x be an original image (or a video frame), and t(·) be the physical transformer.
The transformed image z under t is given by
z = t(x). (1)
Existing transformations. In [1], the parametric transformers include scaling, trans-
lation, rotation, brightness and additive Gaussian noise; see details in [1, Appendix D].
In [23], the geometry and lighting transformations are studied via parametric models.
Other transformations including perspective transformation, brightness adjustment, re-
sampling (or image resizing), smoothing and saturation are considered in [29, 9]. All
the existing transformations are included in our library of physical transformations.
However, they are not sufficient to model the cloth deformation caused by pose change
of a moving person. For example, the second and third rows of Fig. 1 show that adver-
sarial T-shirts designed against only existing physical transformations yield low attack
success rates.
，， 
户
，，， 
，，
、ι－－－－－－－－－－－－－
，， 
户
，，， 
，，
、ι－－－－－－－－－－－－－
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2: Generation of TPS. (a) and (b): Two frames with checkerboard detection results. (c): Anchor
point matching process between two frames (d): Real-world close deformation in (b) versus the synthesized
TPS transformation (right plot).
TPS transformation for cloth deformation. A person’s movement can result in sig-
nificantly and constantly changing wrinkles (aka deformations) in her clothes. This
makes it challenging to develop an adversarial T-shirt effectively in the real world. To
circumvent this challenge, we employ TPS mapping [4] to model the cloth deformation
caused by human body movement. TPS has been widely used as the non-rigid trans-
formation model in image alignment and shape matching [19]. It consists of an affine
component and a non-affine warping component. We will show that the non-linear
warping part in TPS can provide an effective means of modeling cloth deformation for
learning adversarial patterns of non-rigid objects.
TPS learns a parametric deformation mapping from an original image x to a target
image z through a set of control points with given positions. Let p := (φ, ψ) denote
the 2D location of an image pixel. The deformation from x to z is then characterized
by the displacement of every pixel, namely, how a pixel at p(x) on image x changes to
the pixel on image z at p(z), where φ(z) = φ(x) + ∆φ and ψ(z) = ψ(x) + ∆ψ , and ∆φ
and ∆ψ denote the pixel displacement on image x along φ direction and ψ direction,
respectively.
Given a set of n control points with locations {pˆ(x)i := (φˆ(x)i , ψˆ(x)i )}ni=1 on image
x, TPS provides a parametric model of pixel displacement when mapping p(x) to p(z)
[8]
∆(p(x);θ) =a0 + a1φ
(x) + a2ψ
(x) +
n∑
i=1
ciU(‖pˆ(x)i − p(x)‖2), (2)
where U(r) = r2 log(r) and θ = [c; a] are the TPS parameters, and ∆(p(x);θ) repre-
sents the displacement along either φ or ψ direction.
Moreover, given the locations of control points on the transformed image z (namely,
{pˆ(z)i }ni=1), TPS resorts to a regression problem to determine the parameters θ in (2).
The regression objective is to minimize the distance between {∆φ(p(x)i ;θφ)}ni=1 and
{∆ˆφ,i := φˆ(z)i −φˆ(x)i }ni=1 along the φ direction, and the distance between {∆ψ(p(x)i ;θψ)}ni=1
and {∆ˆψ,i := ψˆ(z)i − ψˆ(x)i }ni=1 along the ψ direction, respectively. Thus, TPS (2) is
applied to coordinate φ and ψ separately (corresponding to parameters θφ and θψ).
The regression problem can be solved by the following linear system of equations [10][
K P
PT 03×3
]
θφ =
[
∆ˆφ
03×1
]
,
[
K P
PT 03×3
]
θψ =
[
∆ˆψ
03×1
]
, (3)
where the (i, j)th element of K ∈ Rn×n is given by Kij = U(‖pˆ(x)i − pˆ(x)j ‖2), the ith
row of P ∈ Rn×3 is given by Pi = [1, φˆ(x)i , ψˆ(x)i ], and the ith elements of ∆ˆφ ∈ Rn
and ∆ˆψ ∈ Rn are given by ∆ˆφ,i and ∆ˆψ,i, respectively.
Non-trivial application of TPS The difficulty of implementing TPS for design of
adversarial T-shirts exists from two aspects: 1) How to determine the set of control
points? And 2) how to obtain positions {pˆ(x)i } and {pˆ(z)i } of control points aligned
between a pair of video frames x and z?
To address the first question, we print a checkerboard on a T-shirt and use the
camera calibration algorithm [15, 34] to detect points at the intersection between every
two checkerboard grid regions. These successfully detected points are considered as
the control points of one frame. Fig. 2-(a) shows the checkerboard-printed T-shirt,
together with the detected intersection points. Since TPS requires a set of control
points aligned between two frames, the second question on point matching arises. The
challenge lies in the fact that the control points detected at one video frame are different
from those at another video frame (e.g., due to missing detection). Fig. 2-(a) v.s. (b)
provides an example of point mismatch. To address this issue, we adopt a 2-stage
procedure, coordinate system alignment followed by point aliment, where the former
refers to conducting a perspective transformation from one frame to the other, and the
latter finds the matched points at two frames through the nearest-neighbor method. We
provide an illustrative example in Fig. 2-(c). We refer readers to Appendix A for more
details about our method.
3 Generation of Adversarial T-shirt: An Optimization
Perspective
In this section, we begin by formalizing the problem of adversarial T-shirt and intro-
ducing notations used in our setup. We then propose to design a universal perturbation
used in our adversarial T-shirt to deceive a single object detector. We lastly propose
a min-max (robust) optimization framework to design the universal adversarial patch
against multiple object detectors.
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Figure 3: Overview of the pipeline to generate adversarial T-shirts. First, the video frames con-
taining a person whom wears the T-shirt with printed checkerboard pattern are used as training
data. Second, the universal adversarial perturbation (to be designed) applies to the cloth region
by taking into account different kinds of transformations. Third, the adversarial perturbation is
optimized through problem (6) by minimizing the largest bounding-box probability belonging
to the person class. The optimization procedure is performed as a closed loop through back-
propagation.
Let D := {xi}Mi=1 denote M video frames extracted from one or multiple given
videos, where xi ∈ Rd denotes the ith frame. Let δ ∈ Rd denote the universal ad-
versarial perturbation applied to D. The adversarial T-shirt is then characterized by
Mc,i ◦δ, whereMc,i ∈ {0, 1}d is a bounding box encoding the position of the cloth re-
gion to be perturbed at the ith frame, and ◦ denotes element-wise product. The goal of
adversarial T-shirt is to design δ such that the perturbed frames of D are mis-detected
by object detectors.
Fooling a single object detector. We generalize the Expectation over Transformation
(EoT) method in [3] for design of adversarial T-shirts. Note that different from the
conventional EoT, a transformers’ composition is required for generating an adversarial
T-shirt. For example, a perspective transformation on the bounding box of the T-shirt
is composited with an TPS transformation applied to the cloth region.
Let us begin by considering two video frames, an anchor image x0 (e.g., the first
frame in the video) and a target image xi for i ∈ [M ]1. Given the bounding boxes
of the person (Mp,0 ∈ {0, 1}d) and the T-shirt (Mc,0 ∈ {0, 1}d) at x0, we apply the
perspective transformation from x0 to xi to obtain the bounding boxes Mp,i and Mc,i
at image xi. In the absence of physical transformations, the perturbed image x′i with
respect to (w.r.t.) xi is given by
x′i = (1−Mp,i) ◦ xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+Mp,i ◦ xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
−Mc,i ◦ xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
+Mc,i ◦ δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
, (4)
where the term A denotes the background region outside the bouding box of the per-
son, the termB is the person-bounded region, the term C erases the pixel values within
the bounding box of the T-shirt, and the term D is the newly introduced additive per-
turbation. In (4), the prior knowledge on Mp,i and Mc,i is acquired by person detector
and manual annotation, respectively. Without taking into account physical transforma-
tions, Eq. (4) simply reduces to the conventional formulation of adversarial example
(1−Mc,i) ◦ xi +Mc,i ◦ δ.
Next, we consider three main types of physical transformations: a) TPS transfor-
mation tTPS ∈ TTPS applying to the adversarial perturbation δ for modeling the effect
of cloth deformation, b) physical color transformation tcolor which converts digital col-
ors to those printed and visualized in the physical world, and c) conventional physical
transformation t ∈ T applying to the region within the person’s bounding box, namely,
(Mp,i ◦ xi −Mc,i ◦ xi + Mc,i ◦ δ). Here TTPS denotes the set of possible non-rigid
transformations, tcolor is given by a regression model learnt from the color spectrum
in the digital space to its printed counterpart, and T denotes the set of commonly-used
physical transformations, e.g., scaling, translation, rotation, brightness, blurring and
contrast. A modification of (4) under different sources of transformations is then given
by
x′i =tenv (A + t (B− C + tcolor(Mc,i ◦ tTPS(δ + µv)))) (5)
for t ∈ T , tTPS ∈ TTPS, and v ∼ N (0, 1). In (5), the terms A, B and C have been
defined in (4), and tenv denotes a brightness transformation to model the environmental
brightness condition. In (5), µv is an additive Gaussian noise that allows the variation
of pixel values, where µ is a given smoothing parameter and we set it as 0.03 in our
experiments such that the noise realization falls into the range [−0.1, 0.1]. The random-
ized noise injection is also known as Gaussian smoothing [11], which makes the final
objective function smoother and benefits the gradient computation during optimization.
The prior work, e.g., [28, 12], established a non-printability score (NPS) to measure
the distance between the designed perturbation vector and a library of printable colors
acquired from the physical world. The commonly-used approach is to incorporate NPS
into the attack loss through regularization. However, irt becomes non-trivial to find a
proper regularization parameter, and the nonsmoothness of NPS makes optimization
for the adversarial T-shirt difficult. To circumvent these challenges, we propose to
1[M ] denotes the integer set {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
model the color transformer tcolor using a quadratic polynomial regression. The de-
tailed color mapping is showed in Appendix B.
With the aid of (5), the EoT formulation to fool a single object detector is cast as
minimize
δ
1
M
∑M
i=1 Et,tTPS,v [f(x′i)] + λg(δ) (6)
where f denotes an attack loss for misdetection, g is the total-variation norm that en-
hances perturbations’ smoothness [14], and λ > 0 is a regularization parameter. We
further elaborate on our attack loss f in problem (6). In YOLOv2, a probability score
associated with a bounding box indicates whether or not an object is present within
this box. Thus, we specify the attack loss as the largest bounding-box probability over
all bounding boxes belonging to the ‘person’ class. For Faster R-CNN, we attack all
bounding boxes towards the class ‘background’. The more detailed derivation on the
attack loss is provided in Appendix C. Fig. 3 presents an overview of our approach to
generate adversarial T-shirts.
Min-max optimization for fooling multiple object detectors. Unlike digital space,
the transferability of adversarial attacks largely drops in the physical environment, thus
we consider a physical ensemble attack against multiple object detectors. It was re-
cently shown in [31] that the ensemble attack can be designed from the perspective
of min-max optimization, and yields much higher worst-case attack success rate than
the averaging strategy over multiple models. Given N object detectors associated with
attack loss functions {fi}Ni=1, the physical ensemble attack is cast as
minimize
δ∈C
maximize
w∈P
∑N
i=1 wiφi(δ)− γ2 ‖w − 1/N‖22 + λg(δ), (7)
where w are known as domain weights that adjust the importance of each object detec-
tor during the attack generation, P is a probabilistic simplex given by P = {w|1Tw =
1,w ≥ 0}, γ > 0 is a regularization parameter, and φi(δ) := 1M
∑M
i=1 Et∈T ,tTPS∈TTPS [f(x′i)]
following (6). In (7), if γ = 0, then the adversarial perturbation δ is designed over the
maximum attack loss (worst-case attack scenario) since maximizew∈P
∑N
i=1 wiφi(δ) =
φi∗(δ), where i∗ = argmaxiφi(δ) at a fixed δ. Moreover, if γ → ∞, then the inner
maximization of problem (7) implies w → 1/N , namely, an averaging scheme over
M attack losses. Thus, the regularization parameter γ in (7) strikes a balance between
the max-strategy and the average-strategy.
4 Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach (we call advT-TPS)
for design of the adversarial T-shirt by comparing it with 2 attack baseline methods,
a) adversarial patch to fool YOLOv2 proposed in [30] and its printed version on a T-
shirt (we call advPatch2), and b) the variant of our approach in the absence of TPS
2For fair comparison, we modify the perturbation size same as ours and execute the code provided in
[30] under our training dataset.
transformation, namely, TTPS = ∅ in (5) (we call advT-Affine). We examine the con-
vergence behavior of proposed algorithms as well as its Attack Success Rate3 (ASR)
in both digital and physical worlds. We clarify our algorithmic parameter setting in
Appendix D.
Prior to detailed illustration, we briefly summarize the attack performance of our
proposed adversarial T-shirt. When attacking YOLOv2, our method achieves 74% ASR
in the digital world and 57% ASR in the physical world, where the latter is computed by
averaging successfully attacked video frames over all different scenarios (i.e., indoor,
outdoor and unforeseen scenarios) listed in Table 2. When attacking Faster R-CNN, our
method achieves 61% and 47% ASR in the digital and the physical world, respectively.
By contrast, the baseline advPatch only achieves around 25% ASR in the best case
among all digital and physical scenarios against either YOLOv2 or Faster R-CNN (e.g.,
18% against YOLOv2 in the physical case).
4.1 Experimental Setup
Data collection. We collect two datasets for learning and testing our proposed attack
algorithm in digital and physical worlds. The training dataset contains 40 videos (2003
video frames) from 4 different scenes: one outdoor and three indoor scenes. each video
takes 5-10 seconds and was captured by a moving person wearing a T-shirt with printed
checkerboard. The desired adversarial pattern is then learnt from the training dataset.
The test dataset in the digital space contains 10 videos captured under the same scenes
as the training dataset. This dataset is used to evaluate the attack performance of the
learnt adversarial pattern in the digital world. In the physical world, we customize a
T-shirt with the printed adversarial pattern learnt from our algorithm. Another 24 test
videos (Section 4.3) are then collected at a different time capturing two or three persons
(one of them wearing the adversarial T-shirt) walking a) side by side or b) at different
distances. An additional control experiment in which actors wearing adversarial T-
shirts walk in an exaggerated way is conducted to introduce large pose changes in the
test data. In addition, we also test our adversarial T-shirt by unforeseen scenarios,
where the test videos involve different locations and different persons which are never
covered in the training dataset. All videos were taken using an iPhone X and resized to
416 × 416. In Table A2 of the Appendix F, we summarize the collected dataset under
all circumstances.
Object detectors. We use two state-of-the-art object detectors: Faster R-CNN [27]
and YOLOv2 [26] to evaluate our method. These two object detectors are both pre-
trained on COCO dataset [22] which contains 80 classes including ‘person’. The de-
tection minimum threshold are set as 0.7 for both Faster R-CNN and YOLOv2 by
default. The sensitivity analysis of this threshold is performed in Fig. A4 Appendix D.
3ASR is given by the ratio of successfully attacked testing frames over the total number of testing frames.
4.2 Adversarial T-shirt in the digital world
Convergence performance of our proposed attack algorithm. In Fig. 4, we show
ASR against the epoch number used by our proposed algorithm to solve problem (6).
Here the success of our attack at one testing frame is required to meet two conditions,
a) misdetection of the person who wears the adversarial T-shirt, and b) successful de-
tection of the person whom dresses a normal cloth. As we can see, the proposed attack
method covnerges well for attacking both YOLOv2 and Faster R-CNN. We also note
that attacking Faster R-CNN is more difficult than attacking YOLOv2. Furthermore,
if TPS is not applied during training, then ASR drops around 30% compared to our
approach by leveraging TPS.
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Figure 4: ASR v.s. epoch numbers against YOLOv2 (left) and Faster R-CNN (right).
ASR of adversarial T-shirts in various attack settings. We perform a more com-
prehensive evaluation on our methods by digital simulation. Table 1 compares the ASR
of adversarial T-shirts generated w/ or w/o TPS transformation in 4 attack settings: a)
single-detector attack referring to adversarial T-shirts designed and evaluated using the
same object detector, b) transfer single-detector attack referring to adversarial T-shirts
designed and evaluated using different object detectors, c) ensemble attack (average)
given by (7) but using the average of attack losses of individual models, and d) en-
semble attack (min-max) given by (7). As we can see, it is crucial to incorporate TPS
transformation in the design of adversarial T-shirts: without TPS, the ASR drops from
61% to 34% when attacking faster R-CNN and drops from 74% to 48% when attacking
YOLOv2 in the single-detector attack setting. We also note that the transferability of
single-detector attack is weak in all settings. And faster R-CNN is consistently more
robust than YOLOv2, similar to the results in Fig. 4. Compared to our approach and
advT-Affine, the baseline method advPatch yields the worst ASR when attacking a sin-
gle detector. Furthermore, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed min-max en-
semble attack (7). As we can see, when attacking faster R-CNN, the min-max ensemble
attack significantly outperforms its counterpart using the averaging strategy, leading to
15% improvement in ASR. This improvement is at the cost of 7% degradation when
attacking YOLOv2.
Table 1: The ASR (%) of adversarial T-shirts generated from our approach, advT-Affine and the
baseline advPatch under digital-world.
method model target transfer ensemble(average) ensemble(min-max)
advPatch[30] 22% 10% N/A N/A
advT-Affine Faster R-CNN 34% 11% 16% 32%
advT-TPS(ours) 61% 10% 32% 47%
advPatch[30] 24% 10% N/A N/A
advT-Affine YOLOv2 48% 13% 31% 27%
advT-TPS(ours) 74% 13% 60% 53%
4.3 Adversarial T-shirt in the physical world
We next evaluate our method in the physical world. First, we generate an adversarial
pattern by solving problem (6) against YOLOv2 and Faster R-CNN, following Sec-
tion 4.2. We then print the adversarial pattern on a white T-shirt, leading to the adver-
sarial T-shirt. For fair comparison, we also print adversarial patterns generated by the
advPatch [30] and advT-Affine in Section 4.2 on white T-shirts of the same style. It is
worth noting that different from evaluation by taking static photos of physical adversar-
ial examples, our evaluation is conducted at a more practical and challenging setting.
That is because we record videos to track a moving person wearing adversarial T-shirts,
which could encounter multiple environment effects such as distance, deformation of
the T-shirt, poses and angles of the moving person.
In Table 2, we compare our method with advPatch and advT-Affine under 3 specified
scenarios, including the indoor, outdoor, and unforeseen scenarios4, together with the
overall case of all scenarios. We observe that our method achieves 64% ASR (against
YOLOv2), which is much higher than advT-Affine (39%) and advPatch (19%) in the
indoor scenario. Compared to the indoor scenario, evading person detectors in the
outdoor scenario becomes more challenging. The ASR of our approach reduces to 47%
but outperforms advT-Affine (36%) and advPatch (17%). This is not surprising since the
outdoor scenario suffers more environmental variations such as lighting change. Even
considering the unforeseen scenario, we find that our adversarial T-shirt is robust to the
change of person and location, leading to 48% ASR against Faster R-CNN and 59%
ASR against YOLOv2. Compared to the digital results, the ASR of our adversarial T-
shirt drops around 10% in all tested physical-world scenarios; see specific video frames
in Fig. A5.
4.4 Ablation Study
In this section, we conduct more experiments for better understanding the robustness
of our adversarial T-shirt against various conditions including angles and distances
to camera, camera view, person’s pose, and complex scenes that include crowd and
occlusion. Since the baseline method (advPatch) performs poorly in most of these
scenarios, we focus on evaluating our method (advT-TPS) against advT-Affine using
YOLOv2. We refer readers to Appendix E for details on the setup of our ablation
4Unforeseen scenarios refer to test videos that involve different locations and actors, never seen in the
training dataset.
Table 2: The ASR (%) of adversarial T-shirts generated from our approach, advT-Affine and
advPatch under different physical-world scenes.
method model indoor outdoor new scenes average ASR
advPatch[30] 15% 16% 12% 14%
advT-Affine Faster R-CNN 27% 25% 25% 26%
advT-TPS(ours) 50% 42% 48% 47%
advPatch[30] 19% 17% 17% 18%
advT-Affine YOLOv2 39% 36% 34% 37%
advT-TPS(ours) 64% 47% 59% 57%
study.
Angles and distances to camera. In Fig. 5, we present ASRs of advT-TPS and advT-
Affine when the actor whom wears the adversarial T-shit at different angles and dis-
tances to the camera. As we can see, advT-TPS works well within the angle 20◦ and
the distance 4m. And advT-TPS consistently outperforms advT-Affine. We also note
that ASR drops significantly at the angle 30◦ since it induces occlusion of the adver-
sarial pattern. Further, if the distance is greater than 7m, the pattern cannot clearly be
seen from the camera.
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Figure 5: Average ASR v.s. different angles (left) and distance (right).
Human Pose. In Table 3 (left), we evaluate the effect of pose change on advT-TPS,
where videos are taken for an actor with some distinct postures including crouching,
siting and running in place; see Fig. 6 for specific examples. To alleviate other latent
effects, the camera was made to look straight at the person at a fixed distance of about
1 ∼ 2m away from the person. As we can see, advT-TPS consistently outperforms
advT-Affine. However, it is worth noting that the sitting posture remains challenging for
both methods as the larger occlusion is the worse ASR is. To delve into this problem,
Fig. A6 presents how well our adversarial T-shirt can handle occlusion by partially
covering the T-shirt by hand. Not surprisingly, both advT-Affine and advT-TPS may fail
when occlusion becomes quite large. Thus, occlusion is still an interesting problem for
physical adversaries.
Complex scenes. In Table 3 (right), we test our adversarial T-shirt in several com-
plex scenes with cluttered backgrounds, including a) an office with multiple objects
and people moving around; b) a parking lot with vehicles and pedestrians; and c) a
crossroad with busy traffic and crowd. We observe that compared to advT-Affine, advT-
TPS is reasonably effective in complex scenes without suffering a significant loss of
ASR. Compared to the other factors such as camera angle and occlusion, cluttered
background and even crowd are probably the least of a concern for our approach. This
is explainable, as our approach works on object proposals directly to suppress the clas-
sifier.
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Figure 6: Some video frames of person who wears adversarial T-shirt generated by advT-Affine (first row)
and advT-TPS (second row) with different poses.
Table 3: The ASR (%) of adversarial T-shirts generated from our approach, advT-Affine and
advPatch under different physical-world scenarios.
Method
Pose
crouching siting running
advT-Affine 27% 26% 52%
advT-TPS 53% 32% 63%
Method
Scenario
office parking lot crossroad
advT-Affine 69% 53% 51%
advT-TPS 73% 65% 54%
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose Adversarial T-shirt, the first successful adversarial wearable
to evade detection of moving persons. Since T-shirt is a non-rigid object, its defor-
mation induced by a person’s pose change is taken into account when generating ad-
versarial perturbations. We also propose a min-max ensemble attack algorithm to fool
multiple object detectors simultaneously. We show that our attack against YOLOv2
can achieve 74% and 57% attack success rate in the digital and physical world, re-
spectively. By contrast, the advPatch method can only achieve 24% and 18% ASR.
Based on our studies, we hope to provide some implications on how the adversarial
perturbations can be implemented in physical worlds.
Figure 7: The person who wear our adversarial T-shirt generate by TPS in three complex scenes: office,
parking lot and crossroad.
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Appendix
In the supplement, we provide details on the thin plate spline (TPS) transformation,
the formulation of attack loss, the setting of algorithmic parameters, and the additional
experiments of the adversarial T-shirt in the physical world.
A How to construct TPS transformation?
frame 1 in Fig.2a frame 2 in Fig.2b
Figure A1: Four manually annotated corner points (blue) used to generate the bounding box of
cloth region at frame i, namely, Mc,i. And 8× 16 anchor points (red) on the checkerboard used
to generate TPS transformation tTPS between two video frames.
We first manually annotate four corner points (see blue markers in Figure A1) to
conduct a perspective transformation between two frames at different time instants.
This perspective transformation is used to align the coordinate system of anchor points
used for TPS transformation between two frames.
Ideally, the checkerboard detection tool [15, 34] always outputs a grid of corner
points detected. In most cases, it can locate all the 8 × 16 points on the checkerboard
perfectly, so no additional effort is needed to establish the point correspondences be-
tween two images. In the case when there are corner points missing in the detection,
we use the following method to match two images. We perform a point matching
procedure (see Algorithm 1) to align the anchor points (see red markers in Figure A1)
detected by the checkerboard detection tool. The data matching procedure selects the
set of matched anchor points used for constructing TPS transformation.
B Color transformation
As shown in Figure A2, we generate the training dataset to map a digital color palette
to the same one printed on a T-shirt. With the aid of 960 color cell pairs. We learn the
weights of the quadratic polynomial regression by minimizing the mean squared error
of the predicted physical color (with the digital color in Figure A2(a) as input) and the
Algorithm 1 Constructing TPS transformation
1: Input: Given original image x1 (frame 1) with r1 × c1 anchor points, each of
which has coordinate p(1)[i, j], where i ∈ [r1], j ∈ [c1] and [n] denotes the integer
set {1, 2, . . . , n}, target image x2 (frame 2) with r2 × c2 anchor points, each of
which has coordinate p(2)[i, j], where i ∈ [r2] and j ∈ [c2], distance tolerance
 > 0, and empty vectors p˜(1) and p˜(2).
2: Output: Matched r × c anchor points p˜(1)[i, j] versus p˜(2)[i, j] for i ∈ [r] and
j ∈ [c], and TPS transformation tTPS from x1 to x2.
3: for (i, j) ∈ [r1]× [c1] do
4: given p(1)[i, j] in x1, find the candidate of matching point p(2)[i′, j′] by nearest
neighbor in x2,
5: if ‖p(1)[i, j]− p(2)[i′, j′]‖2 ≤  then
6: matching p(1)[i, j] with p(2)[i′, j′], and adding them into p˜(1) and p˜(2)
respectively,
7: end if
8: end for
9: build TPS transformation tTPS by solving Eq. (2) given p˜(1) and p˜(2).
ground-truth physical color provided in Figure A2(b). Once the color transformer tcolor
is learnt, we then incorporate it into (5).
(a) (b) (c)
Figure A2: Physical color transformation. (a): The digital color map (b): The printed color map
on a T-shirt (captured by the camera of iPhone X). (c): The predicted transformation from (a)
via the learnt polynomial regression.
C Formulation of attack loss
There are two possible options to formulate the attack loss f to fool person detectors.
First, f is specified as the misclassification loss, commonly-used in most of previous
works. The goal is to misclassify the class ‘person’ to any other incorrect class. How-
ever, our work consider a more advanced disappearance attack, which enforces the
detector even not to draw the bounding box of the object ‘person’. For YOLOv2, we
minimize the confidence score of all bounding boxes corresponding to the class ‘per-
son’. For Faster R-CNN, we attack all bounding boxes towards the class ‘background’.
Let x′i be a perturbed video frame, the attack loss in (6) is then given by
f(x′i) = max
j
{max{pj(x′i), ν} · 1|Bj∩Mp,i|>η}, (8)
where pj(x′i) denotes the confidence score of the jth bounding box for YOLOv2 or
the probability of the ‘person’ class at the jth bounding box for Faster R-CNN, ν is
a confidence threshold, the use of max{pj(x′i), ν} enforces the optimizer to minimize
the bounding boxes of high probability (greater than ν), Bj is the jth bounding box,
Mp,i is the known bounding box encoding the person’s region, the quantity |Bj∩Mp,i|
represents the intersection between Bj and Mp,i, | · | is the cardinality function, and
1|Bj∩Mp,i|>η is the indicator function, which returns 1 if Bj has at least η-overlapping
with Mc,i, and 0 otherwise. In Eq.(8), the quantity max{pj(x′i), ν} · 1|Bj∩Mp,i|>η
characterizes the bounding box of our interest with both high probability and large
overlapping with Mp,i. And the eventual loss in Eq.(8) gives the largest probability for
detecting a bounding box of the object ‘person’.
D Hyperparameter setting
When solving Eq. (6), we use Adam optimizer [20] to train 5,000 epochs with the
initial learning rate, 1 × 10−2. The rate is decayed when the loss ceases to decrease.
The regularization parameter λ for total-variation norm is set as 3. In Eq. (7), we set
γ as 1, and solve the min-max problem by 6000 epochs with the initial learning rate
1× 10−2. In Eq. (5), the details of transformations t are shown in Table A1.
Transformation Minimum Maximum
Scale 0.5 2
Brightness -0.1 0.1
Contrast 0.8 1.2
Random uniform noise -0.1 0.1
Blurring average pooling/filter size = 5
Table A1: The conventional transformations t in Eq. (5).
In experiments, we find that the hyperparameter λ strikes a balance between the
fine-gained perturbation pattern and its smoothness. As we can see in Figure A3, when
λ is smallest (namely, λ = 1), the perturbation can achieve the best ASR (82% ) against
YOLOv2 in the digital space, however when we test the digital pattern in the physical
world, the attacking performance drops to 51% (worse than the case of λ = 3) as the
non-smooth (sharp) perturbation pattern might not be well captured by a real-world
camera. In our experiments, we choose λ = 3 for the best tradeoff between digital and
physical results.
For a real-world deployment of a person detector, the minimum detection threshold
needs to be empirically determined to obtain a good tradeoff between detection accu-
racy and false alarm rates. In our physical-word testing, we set the threshold to 0.7 for
λ 1 3 5
digital 82% 74% 69%
physical 51% 57% 55%
Figure A3: ASR v.s. λ against YOLOv2.
Faster R-CNN and YOLOv2, at which both of them achieve detection accuracy over
97% on person wearing normal clothing. The sensitivity analysis of this threshold is
provided in Figure A4.
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Figure A4: The detection accuracy of YOLOV2 and Faster R-CNN under different detection
thresholds . ‘Normal’ means the case of persons wearing normal clothing, and ‘adv. T-shirt’
means the case of persons wearing the adversarial T-shirt.
E Dataset details
In Table A2, we summarize dataset we used in Section 4.2 and 4.3.
In Section 4.4 for ablation study on parameter sensitivity and generalization to more
complex testing scenarios, we further collected some new test data. Specifically, we
considered the scenario of five people (two females and three males) for ablation study
and none of them appeared in the original training and testing datasets. We recorded
multiple videos by using two cameras (one iPhone X and one iPhone XI) and reported
the resulting ASR in average.
Table A2: Summary of our collected dataset in each scenes. The values in the table are presented
by number of videos (total number of frames) in each scene, ie, 4 (177) means 4 videos and 177
frames in total.
videos (frames) indoor outdoor overall
office elevator hallway street1 street2
single-person 4 (177) 4 (135) 4 (230) 4 (225) 4 (240) 20 (1007)
multi-persons 4 (162) 4 (132) 4 (245) 4 (230) 4 (227) 20 (996)
train 6 (245) 6 (180) 6 (335) 6 (344) 6 (365) 30 (1469)
test (digital) 2 (94) 2 (87) 2 (140) 2 (111) 2 (102) 10 (534)
unseen elevator hallway street3
test (physical) 6 (236) 6 (184) 6 (220) 6 (288) 24 (928)
F More experimental results
In Figure A5, we demonstrate our physical-world attack results in two scenarios: a)
adversarial T-shirts generated by advT-TPS, advT-Affine and advPatch in an outdoor
scenario (the first three rows), b) adversarial T-shirts generated by advT-TPS and advT-
Affine in an unseen scenario (at a location never seen in the training dataset). As we can
see, our method outperforms affine and baseline. In the absence of TPS, adversarial
T-shirts generated by affine and baseline fail in most of cases, implying the importance
of TPS to model the T-shirt deformation. When a person whom wears the adversarial
T-shirt walks towards the camera, as expected, the detector also becomes easier to be
attacked.
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Figure A5: Some testing frames in the physical world using adversarial T-shirt against YOLOv2. All
frames are performed by two persons with one wearing the proposed adversarial T-shirt, generated by our
method (advT-TPS), advT-Affine and advPatch. The first three rows: an unseen outdoor scenes. The last two
rows: an unseen indoor scenes.
advT-Affine advT-TPS
Figure A6: When advT-Affine and advT-TPS happen occlusion by hand.
